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Abstract
We study a toy model of linear-quadratic mean field game with delay. We “lift” the
delayed dynamic into an infinite dimensional space, and recast the mean field game
system which is made of a forward Kolmogorov equation and a backward Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation. We identify the corresponding master equation. A solution
to this master equation is computed, and we show that it provides an approximation
to a Nash equilibrium of the finite player game.
Keywords: inter-bank borrowing and lending, stochastic game with delay, Nash equi-
librium, Master equation
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1 Introduction
A linear quadratic stochastic game model of inter-bank borrowing and lending was proposed
in [6]. In this model, each individual bank tries to minimize its costs by controlling its rate of
borrowing or lending to a central bank with no obligation to pay back its loan. The finding is
that, in equilibrium, the central bank acts as a clearing house providing liquidity, and hence
stability is enhanced. This model was extended in [5], where a delay in the controls was
introduced. The financial motivation is that banks are responsible for the past borrowing
or lending, and need to make a repayment after a fixed time (the delay). In this model,
the dynamics of the log-monetary reserves of the banks are described by stochastic delayed
differential equations (SDDE). A closed-loop Nash equilibrium is identified by formulating
the original SDDE in an infinite dimensional space formed by the state and the past of
the control, and by solving the corresponding infinite dimensional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
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(HJB) equation. For general stochastic equations and control theory in infinite dimension,
we refer to [1], [9], and [8].
In this paper, we study the mean field game (MFG) corresponding to the model proposed
in [5] as the number of banks goes to infinity. We identify the mean field game system,
which is a system of coupled partial differential equations (PDEs). The forward Kolmogorov
equation describes the dynamics of the joint law of current state and past control, and
the backward HJB equation describes the evolution of the value function. Recently, J.-
M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions introduced the concept of “master equation” which contains all
the information about the MFG. The well-posedness of this master equation in presence of a
common noise and convergence of the N -player system is analyzed in [2] by a PDE approach.
A probabilistic approach is proposed in [3] and [7]. See also the two-volume book [4] for a
complete account of this approach.
In this paper, the master equation for our delayed mean field game is derived, a solution
is given explicitly, and we show that it is the limit of the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of
the N -player game system as N →∞.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the stochastic game
model with delay presented in [5]. Then, in Section 3, we construct the corresponding mean
field game system. In Section 4, we define derivatives with respect to probability measures
in the space P(H) where H is the Hilbert space defined at the beginning of Section 2.2. In
addition, we derive the master equation, and exhibit an explicit solution. Furthermore, in
Section 5, we show that this solution of the master equation is an approximation of order
1/N to the solution of the finite-player Nash system. Lastly, in Section 6, we compare the
solution of the Nash system, the solution of the mean field game system, and the solution
to the master equation.
2 A differential game with delay
2.1 The model
Let (X it , i = 1, · · · , N) represents the log-monetary reserves of the N banks at time t. At
each time t, bank i controls its rate of borrowing or lending αit, and it also needs to make a
repayment after a fixed time τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , at a rate denoted by αit−τ . The dynamic
of log-monetary reserves for each bank is given by
dX it = (α
i
t − α
i
t−τ )dt+ σdW
i
t , (2.1)
2
with deterministic initial conditions
X i0 = ξ
i, and αis = φ
i(s) for s ∈ [−τ, 0], (2.2)
where W it , i = 1, . . . , N are independent standard Brownian motions, and banks have the
same volatility σ > 0.
Bank i interacts with other banks by choosing its own strategy in order to minimize its
cost functional J i(αi, α−i), which involves the average of log-monetary reserves of all the other
banks. The notation α−i is a (N − 1) tuple of the αj with j 6= i and j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, which
represents all other banks’ control except bank i. The cost functional for bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
is given by:
J i(αi, α−i) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(XT )
]
, (2.3)
where the running and terminal cost functions f and g are:
fi(x, α
i) =
1
2
(αi)2 +
ǫ
2
(x¯− xi)2, with x¯ :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk, and ǫ > 0,
gi(x) =
c
2
(x¯− xi)2, c ≥ 0.
(2.4)
2.2 Construction of a Nash equilibrium
In order to apply the dynamic programming principle to identify a closed-loop Nash equilib-
rium, we have to enlarge the state space by including the path of past controls, which lie in
H := L2([−τ, 0];R), the Hilbert space of square integrable real functions defined on [−τ, 0],
and write an infinite dimensional representation for our system. This evolution equation ap-
proach was initiated in [12] under a deterministic control setting, and later was generalized
in [10] to a stochastic control problem.
Given z ∈ R × H, z0 ∈ R, and z1 ∈ H will denote the two components of the product
space R×H. The inner product on R×H will be denoted by 〈·, ·〉, and it is defined by
〈z, z˜〉 = z0z˜0 +
∫ 0
−τ
z1(s)z˜1(s)ds. (2.5)
Therefore, the new state is denoted by Z it = (Z
i
0,t, Z
i
1,t(s)), s ∈ [−τ, 0], which corresponds to
(X it , α
i
t−τ−s) in the notation of the original system (2.1).
Bank i tries to minimize its cost functional J i(αi, α−i) defined by
J i(t, z, αi, α−i) = E
[∫ T
t
fi(Z0,s, α
i
s)ds+ gi(Z0,T )|Zt = z
]
. (2.6)
3
After all other players j 6= i have chosen their optimal strategies which minimize their cost
functionals, player i’s value function V i(t, z) is defined by
V i(t, z) = inf
αi
J i(t, z, αi, α−i).
By dynamic programming principle, the value function V i(t, z) must satisfy the following
infinite dimensional HJB equation (see [9] Chapter 2 for details):
∂tV
i(t, z) +
1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzV
i(t, z)) +
N∑
k=1
〈Azk, ∂zkV
i(t, z)〉
+ inf
αi
[
N∑
k=1
〈Bαk, ∂zkV
i(t, z)〉 + fi(z0, α
i)
]
= 0, (2.7)
with terminal condition V i(T, z) = c
2
(z¯0−z
i
0)
2, where the operatorA : D(A) ⊂ R×H→ R×H
is defined as
A : (z0, z1(s))→
(
z1(0),−
dz1(s)
ds
)
a.e., s ∈ [−τ, 0],
and its domain is D(A) = {(z0, z1(·)) ∈ R×H : z1(·) ∈ W
1,2([−τ, 0];R), z1(−τ) = 0}.
The adjoint of A is A∗ : D(A∗) ⊂ R×H→ R×H and is defined by
A∗ : (z0, z1(s))→
(
0,
dz1(s)
ds
)
a.e., s ∈ [−τ, 0],
with domain D(A∗) = {(z0, z1(·)) ∈ R×H : z1(·) ∈ W
1,2([−τ, 0];R), z0 = z1(0)}.
The operator B : R → R×H is defined by
B : u→ (u,−δ−τ (s)u), s ∈ [−τ, 0],
where δ−τ (·) is the Dirac measure at −τ .
The adjoint of B is B∗ : R×H→ R given by
B∗ : (z0, z1(s))→ z0 − z1(−τ).
The operator G : RN → RN ×HN is defined by
G : z0 → (σz0, 0).
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The infinite dimensional representation of the original system (2.1) is given by
dZ it = (AZ
i
t +Bα
i
t)dt+GdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Z i0 = (ξ
i, φi(s)) ∈ H.
(2.8)
By minimizing the Hamiltonian in (2.7), the infimum can be computed, so that the
optimal control is attained at
αˆi = −〈B, ∂ziV
i〉 = −
(
∂zi
0
V i − [∂zi
1
V i](−τ)
)
. (2.9)
Assuming that each player follows its own optimal strategy (αˆi)1≤i≤N , which forms a Nash
equilibrium, the corresponding value function follows the HJB equation
∂tV
i + 1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzV
i) +
∑N
k=1〈Az
k, ∂zkV
i〉
−
∑
k 6=i (B
∗∂zkV
i) ·
(
B∗∂zkV
k
)
− 1
2
(B∗∂ziV
i)2 + ǫ
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2 = 0. (2.10)
After applying the definitions of the operators A,B and Q, the HJB equation for player i
becomes:
∂tV
i +
N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
V i +
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
V i)ds
−
N∑
k 6=i
(
∂zk
0
V k − [∂zk
1
V k](−τ)
)(
∂zk
0
V i − [∂zk
1
V i](−τ)
)
−
1
2
(
∂zi
0
V i − [∂zi
1
V i](−τ)
)2
+
ǫ
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2 = 0. (2.11)
As shown in [5], a solution of the system (2.11) can be found in the form
V i(t, z) = E0(t)(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2 − 2(z¯0 − z
i
0)
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(z¯1 − z
i
1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(z¯1 − z
i
1)(z¯1 − z
i
1)dsdr + E3(t), (2.12)
for some deterministic functions E0(t), E1(t, s), E2(t, s, r), and E3(t) satisfying the following
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PDEs
dE0(t)
dt
+ 2
(
1
N2
− 1
)
(E0(t) + E1(t, 0))
2 +
ǫ
2
= 0,
∂E1(t, s)
∂t
−
∂E1(t, s)
∂s
+ 2
(
1
N2
− 1
)
(E0(t) + E1(t, 0))(E1(t, s) + E2(t, s, 0)) = 0,
∂E2(t, s, r)
∂t
−
∂E2(t, s, r)
s
−
∂E2(t, s, r)
r
+ 2
(
1
N2
− 1
)
(E1(t, s) + E2(t, s, 0))(E1(t, r) + E2(t, r, 0)) = 0,
dE3(t)
dt
+ (1−
1
N
)σ2E0(t) = 0,
(2.13)
with boundary conditions: ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and ∀s, r ∈ [−τ, 0],
E0(T ) =
c
2
, E1(T, s) = 0, E2(T, s, r) = 0, E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s),
E1(t,−τ) = −E0(t), E2(t, s,−τ) = −E1(t, s), E3(T ) = 0.
(2.14)
This set of PDEs (2.13) with boundary conditions (2.14) admits a unique solution as shown
in [12], and the optimal strategies take the integral form
αˆit = 2
(
1−
1
N
)[
(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) (z¯0 − z
i
0)
−
∫ 0
−τ
(E2(t,−τ − s, 0) + E1(t,−τ − s))(z¯1 − z
i
1)ds
]
. (2.15)
3 The mean field game system
The mean field game theory describes the structure of a game with infinite many indis-
tinguishable players. All players are rational, i.e., each player tries to minimize their cost
against the mass of other players. This assumption implies that the running cost and ter-
minal cost in (2.4) only depend on i-th player’s state zi0 and the empirical distribution of
(zj0)j 6=i. Denoting this empirical distribution by
µi0 =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
z
j
0
,
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these costs, as in (2.4), can be re-written as
fi(z0, α
i) =
1
2
(αi)2 +
ǫ
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2
=
1
2
(αi)2 +
ǫ
2
(
1−
1
N
)2(∫
R
y0dµ
i
0(y0)− z
i
0
)2
:= f(zi0, µ
i
0, α
i),
gi(z0) =
c
2
(
1−
1
N
)2(∫
R
y0dµ
i
0(y0)− z
i
0
)2
:= g(zi0, µ
i
0).
(3.1)
As the number N of players goes to ∞, the joint empirical distribution of the states and
past controls Zjt = (Z
j
0,t, Z
j
1,t)
νit :=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ(Zj
0,t,Z
j
1,t)
,
with marginals
µi0,t =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
Z
j
0,t
, µi1,t =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
Z
j
1,t
,
converges to a deterministic limit denoted by ν(t) (with marginals denoted by µ0(t) and
µ1(t)). Here, we assume that, at time 0, ν
i
0 satisfies the LLN (for instance with i.i.d. Z
j
0),
and that the propagation of chaos property holds. A full justification of this property would
involve generalizing the result in Section 2.1 of [3] to an infinite dimensional setting in order
to take into account the past of the controls. This is highly technical but intuitively sound.
A complete proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the limit, a single representative player tries to minimize his cost functional, and,
dropping the index i, his value function is defined as
V (t, z) = inf
(αs)t≤s≤T
E
[∫ T
t
f(s, Z0,s, µ0(s), αs)ds+ g(Z0,T , µ0(T ))|Zt = z
]
, (3.2)
subject to
dZt = (AZt +Bαt)dt+GdWt. (3.3)
The HJB equation for the value function V (t, z) reads
∂tV +
1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzV ) + 〈AZ, ∂zV 〉
+ inf
α
{
〈Bα, ∂zV 〉+
1
2
α2 +
ǫ
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2}
= 0, (3.4)
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with terminal condition V (T, z) = c
2
(
∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0)
2. Then, we minimize in α to get
αˆt = − (∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ)) . (3.5)
After plugging it into (3.4), our backward HJB equation reads:
∂tV +
1
2
σ2∂z0z0V +
∫ 0
−τ
z1
d
ds
(∂z1V )ds−
1
2
(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))
2
+
ǫ
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2
= 0,
V (T, z) =
c
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2
.
(3.6)
Next, since we “lift” the original non-Markovian optimization problem into a infinite
dimensional Markovian control problem, we are able to characterize the corresponding gen-
erator for (3.3), which is denoted by Lt,
Ltϕ(z) = 〈(AZ +Bαˆt), ∂zϕ〉+
1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzϕ), (3.7)
where ϕ is a smooth function and the time dependency comes from αˆt given by (3.5).
The derivation of the adjoint L∗t of Lt is given in Appendix A. Consequently, the forward
Kolmogorov equation for the distribution ν(t) reads
∂tν =
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1
(
d
ds
z1ν
)
ds−
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1(z1ν)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))ds+ ∂z0{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}
−
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}δ−τ (s)ds+
1
2
σ2∂z0z0ν,
ν(0) = P(ξ, φ(s)s∈[−τ,0]).
(3.8)
Combining (3.6) with (3.8), we obtain the mean field game system. To solve this, We
make the following ansatz for the value function
V (t, z) = E0(t)(m0 − z0)
2 − 2(m0 − z0)
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(m1 − z1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(m1 − z1)(m1 − z1)dsdr + E3(t). (3.9)
where we denote the mean of state m0 :=
∫
R
z0dµ0(z0), and the mean of past control m1 :=
8
∫
H
z1dµ1(z1). Plugging (3.9) into (3.8), multiplying both sides of (3.8) by z0, and integrating
over R×H, we have
∫
R×H
z0∂tνdz =
∫
R×H
z0
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1
(
d
ds
z1ν
)
dsdz −
∫
R×H
z0
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1(z1ν)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dsdz
+
∫
R×H
z0∂z0{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}dz −
∫
R×H
z0
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}δ−τ (s)dsdz
+
∫
R×H
z0
1
2
σ2∂z0z0νdz.
(3.10)
After integration by parts, we obtain
∂tm0 =
∫
R×H
{∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ)} νdz = 0, (3.11)
as can be seen directly using (3.9).
Similarly, plugging (3.9) to (3.8), multiplying both sides of (3.8) by z1, and integrating
over R×H, we get
∫
R×H
z1∂tνdz =
∫
R×H
z1
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1
(
d
ds
z1ν
)
dsdz −
∫
R×H
z1
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1(z1ν)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dsdz
+
∫
R×H
z1∂z0{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}dz −
∫
R×H
z1
∫ 0
−τ
∂z1{(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν}δ−τ (s)dsdz
+
∫
R×H
z1
1
2
σ∂2z0z0νdz.
(3.12)
By integration by parts, we deduce
∂tm1 = −
∫
R×H
∫ 0
−τ
d
ds
z1νdsdz +
∫
R×H
∫ 0
−τ
z1ν(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dsdz
+
∫
R×H
{∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ)} νdz
= 0.
(3.13)
Now we are ready to verify the ansatz (3.9). We first compute the derivative of the
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ansatz,
∂tV =
dE0(t)
dt
(m0 − z0)
2 − 2(m0 − z0)
∫ 0
−τ
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂t
(m1 − z1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂t
(m1 − z1)(m1 − z1)dsdr +
dE3(t)
dt
,
∂z0V = −2E0(t)(m0 − z0) + 2
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(m1 − z1)ds,
∂z1V = 2E1(t,−τ − s)(m0 − z0)− 2
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(m1 − z1)dr,
∂z0z0V = 2E0(t).
(3.14)
Then, we plug the ansatz (3.9) into (2.7), and by collecting (m0−z0)
2 terms, (m0−z0)(m1−z1)
terms, (m1 − z1)
2 terms, and constant terms, we obtain the following system of PDEs:
dE0(t)
dt
− 2(E0(t) + E1(t, 0))
2 +
ǫ
2
= 0,
∂E1(t, s)
∂t
−
∂E1(t, s)
∂s
− 2(E0(t) + E1(t, 0))(E1(t, s) + E2(t, s, 0)) = 0,
∂E2(t, s, r)
∂t
−
∂E2(t, s, r)
s
−
∂E2(t, s, r)
r
− 2(E1(t, s) + E2(t, s, 0))(E1(t, r) + E2(t, r, 0)) = 0,
dE3(t)
dt
+ σ2E0(t) = 0,
(3.15)
with boundary conditions
E0(T ) =
c
2
, E1(T, s) = 0, E2(T, s, r) = 0, E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s),
E1(t,−τ) = −E0(t), E2(t, s,−τ) = −E1(t, s), E3(T ) = 0.
(3.16)
As for (2.13–2.14), the system (3.15–3.16) admits a unique solution.
4 The master equation
4.1 Derivatives
The master equation for this delayed game lies in an infinite dimensional space, and it
requires a notion of derivatives in the space of measures in P(H).
10
The set P(H) of probability measure on H is endowed with Monge-Kantorovich distance
dMK(µ1, µ
′
1) = sup
{∥∥∥∥
∫
H
f(z)d(µ1 − µ
′
1)(z)
∥∥∥∥
H
: f ∈ Lip1(H)
}
, (4.1)
where Lip(H) is the collection of real-valued Lipschitz functions on H with Lipschitz constant
1.
Definition 4.1. We say that F : P(H) → H is C1 if there exists an operator δF
δν
: P(H)×H→
H such that for any µ1 and µ
′
1 ∈ P(H)
lim
ǫ→0+
F (µ1 + ǫ(µ
′
1 − µ1))− F (µ1)
ǫ
=
∫
H
δF
δµ1
(µ1, y1)d(µ
′
1 − µ1)(y1). (4.2)
Definition 4.2. If δF
δµ1
(µ1, y1) is of class C
1 with respect to y1, the marginal derivative
Dµ1F : P(H)×H→ H is defined in the sense of Fre´chet derivative:
Dµ1F (µ1, y1) := Dy1
δF
δµ1
(µ1, y1). (4.3)
Remark 4.3. Usually we will encounter a map U : P(H) → R. In this case, U can be
expressed in a form of composition U˜ ◦ F , where U˜ : H → R, and F : P(H) → H, i.e.,
U = (U˜ ◦ F )(µ1).
If δF
δµ1
is C1 with respect to y1, and U˜ is Fre´chet differentiable, then
δU
δµ1
: P(H)×H→ H,
and Dµ1U : P(H)×H→ H are defined by
δU
δµ1
(µ1, y1) := (DF U˜)
(
δF
δµ1
)
, and Dµ1U(µ1, y1) :=
(
DF U˜
)
(Dµ1F ) . (4.4)
Example 4.4. Suppose U(µ1) =
∫ 0
−τ
∫
H
g(x1(s))dµ1(x1)ds, where g : H → H is Fre´chet
differentiable. Then U(µ1) can be written as U˜ [F (µ1)](s), where U˜ [F ] =
∫ 0
−τ
F (s)ds, and
F (µ1) =
∫
H
g(x1(s))dµ1(x1). Then
F (µ1 + ǫ(µ
′
1 − µ1)) =
∫
H
g(x1(s))d(µ1 + ǫ(µ
′
1 − µ1)).
So
F (µ1 + ǫ(µ
′
1 − µ1))− F (µ1)
ǫ
=
∫
H
g(x1(s))d(µ
′
1 − µ1).
Then
δF
δµ1
(µ1, y1) = g(y1), and Dµ1F (µ1, y1) = Dy1g(y1).
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Since DF U˜ [F ] = 1, we have
δU
δµ1
(µ1, y1) = g(y1) and Dµ1U(µ1, y1) = Dy1g(y1).
4.2 The master equation
Theorem 4.5. For any (t0, ν0) ∈ [0, T ]×P(R×H), we define
U(t0, ·, ν0) := V (t0, ·), (4.5)
where (V, ν) is a classical solution to the system of forward-backward equations (3.6) and
(3.8), with initial condition ν(t0) = ν0, and terminal condition V (T, z) =
c
2
(
∫
R
y0dµ0(y0) −
z0)
2, respectively. Then U must satisfy the following master equation
∂tU(t, z0, z1, ν) +
1
2
σ2∂z0z0U(t, z0, z1, ν) +
1
2
σ2
∫
R
∂y0Dµ0U(t, z0, z1, ν, y0)dµ0(y0)
+
∫ 0
−τ
z1
d
ds
∂z1U(t, z0, z1, ν)ds+
∫ 0
−τ
∫
H
y1
d
ds
[Dµ1U(t, z0, z1, ν, y1)] (s)dµ1(y1)ds
−
∫
R×H
(∂y0U(t, y0, y1, ν)− [∂y1U(t, y0, y1, ν)](−τ))Dµ0U(t, z0, z1, ν, y0)dν(y)
+
∫
R×H
(∂y0U(t, y0, y1, ν)− [∂y1U(t, y0, y1, ν)](−τ)) [Dµ1U(t, z0, z1, ν, y1)](−τ)dν(y)
−
1
2
(∂z0U(t, z0, z1, ν)− [∂z1U(t, z0, z1, ν)](−τ))
2 +
ǫ
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2
= 0, (4.6)
where µ0 and µ1 are the marginal law for Z0 and Z1 respectively.
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Proof. For any h ∈ [0, T − t0], V (t0 + h, ·) = U(t0 + h, ·, ν(t0 + h)). Then
∂tV (t0, z)
=∂tU(t0, z, ν0) +
∫
R×H
δU
δν
(t0, z, ν, y)∂tν(t0, y)dy
=∂tU(t0, z, ν0) +
∫
R×H
δU
δν
(t0, z, ν, y)
(∫ 0
−τ
∂y1
(
d
ds
y1ν
)
ds−
∫ 0
−τ
∂y1(y1ν)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))ds
+∂y0 {(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ))ν} −
∫ 0
−τ
∂y1 {(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ))ν} δ−τ (s)ds+
1
2
σ2∂y0y0ν
)
dy
=∂tU(t0, z, ν0)−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×H
Dµ1U(t0, z, ν, y)
d
ds
y1νdyds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×H
Dµ1Uy1ν(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dyds−
∫
R×H
Dµ0U(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ))νdy
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×H
Dµ1U(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ)ν)δ−τ (s)dyds+
∫
R×H
1
2
σ2∂y0Dµ0Uνdy
=∂tU(t0, z, ν0) +
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×H
y1
d
ds
Dµ1Uνdyds−
∫
R×H
Dµ0U(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ))νdy
+
∫
R×H
[Dµ1U ](−τ)((∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ))νdy +
1
2
σ2
∫
R×H
∂y0Dµ0Uνdy.
(4.7)
On the other hand, V satisfies the HJB (2.7) equation.
∂tV
=−
1
2
σ2∂z0z0V −
∫ 0
−τ
z1
d
ds
(∂z1V )ds+
1
2
(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))
2 −
ǫ
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2
=−
1
2
σ2∂z0z0U −
∫ 0
−τ
z1
d
ds
(∂z1U)ds+
1
2
(∂z0U − [∂z1U ](−τ))
2 −
ǫ
2
(∫
R
y0dµ0(y0)− z0
)2
.
(4.8)
Therefore, subtracting (4.8) from (4.7), we have shown that U satisfies the master equation
(4.6).
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4.3 Explicit solution of the master equation
It turns out that this master equation (4.6) can be solved explicitly by making the following
ansatz, and we also define m0 :=
∫
R
y0dµ0(y0) and m1 :=
∫
H
y1dµ1(y1) for convenience.
U(t, z0, z1, ν) = E0(t)(m0 − z0)
2 − 2(m0 − z0)
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(m1 − z1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(m1 − z1)(m1 − z1)dsdr + E3(t). (4.9)
Then, we compute the partial derivatives needed in (4.6) explicitly, we have
∂tU =
dE0(t)
dt
(m0 − z0)
2 − 2(m0 − z0)
∫ 0
−τ
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂t
(m1 − z1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂t
(m1 − z1)(m1 − z1)dsdr +
dE3(t)
dt
,
∂z0U = −2E0(t)(m0 − z0) + 2
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(m1 − z1)ds,
∂z1U = 2E1(t,−τ − s)(m0 − z0)− 2
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(m1 − z1)dr,
Dµ0U = 2E0(t)(m0 − z0)− 2
∫ 0
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(m1 − z1)ds,
Dµ1U = −2E1(t,−τ − s)(m0 − z0) + 2
∫ 0
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(m1 − z1)dr,
∂z0z0U = 2E0(t),
(4.10)
and plug those into our master equation (4.6). We have
dE0(t)
dt
(m0 − z0)
2 − 2(m0 − z0)
∫ 0
−τ
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂t
(m1 − z1)ds
+
∫ 0
−τ
∫ 0
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂t
(m1 − z1)(m1 − z1)dsdr +
dE3(t)
dt
+
1
2
σ2(2E0(t))
−
∫ 0
−τ
(m1 − z1)
(
2
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂s
(m0 − z0)− 2
∫ 0
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂s
(m1 − z1)dr
)
ds
− 2
(
(E0(t) + E1(t, 0))(m0 − z0)−
∫ 0
−τ
(E1(t,−τ − s) + E2(t,−τ − s, 0))(m1 − z1)ds
)2
+
ǫ
2
(m0 − z0)
2 = 0.
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Collecting (m0 − z0)
2 terms, (m0 − z0)(m1 − z1) terms, (m1 − z1)
2 terms, and constant
terms, we obtain that the function Ei, i = 0, · · · , 3, satisfy the system of PDEs (3.15) with
boundary conditions (3.16).
5 Convergence of the Nash system
From the previous section, we have seen that our master equation is well posed, and we
obtained an explicit solution. Furthermore, it also describes the limit of Nash equilibria of
the N -player games as N → ∞. In this section, generalizing to the case with delay the
results of [2] (see also [11]), we show that the solution of the Nash system (2.11) converges
to the solution of the master equation (4.6) as number of players N → +∞, with a 1/N
Cesaro convergence rate.
In Section 4, we find that (4.9) is a solution to the master equation (4.6). We set
ui(t, z0, z1) := U(t, z
i
0, z
i
1, ν
i), where νi = 1
N−1
∑
k 6=i δ(zk0 ,zk1 ), denotes the joint empirical mea-
sure of z0 and z1. The empirical measure of z0 is given by µ
i
0 =
1
N−1
∑
k 6=i δzk0 , and the
empirical measure of z1 is given by µ
i
1 =
1
N−1
∑
k 6=i δzk1 . Note that, by direct computation,
for k 6= i, and any N ≥ 2,
∂zk
0
ui(t, z0, z1) =
1
N − 1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 ),
∂zk
1
ui(t, z0, z1) =
1
N − 1
Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 ),
∂zk
0
zk
0
ui(t, z0, z1) =
1
N − 1
∂zk
0
[Dµi
0
U ](t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 ) +
1
(N − 1)2
Dµi
0
µi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 , z
k
0 ).
(5.1)
Proposition 5.1. For any i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, ui(t, z0, z1) satisfies
∂tu
i+
N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
ui+
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
ui)ds−
N∑
k 6=i
(
∂zk
0
uk − [∂zk
1
uk](−τ)
)(
∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ)
)
−
1
2
(
∂zi
0
ui − [∂zi
1
ui](−τ)
)2
+
ǫ
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2 + ei(t, z) = 0, (5.2)
where ‖ei(t, z)‖ < C
N
, with terminal condition ui(T, z) = c
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2.
This shows that (ui)i∈{1,...,N} is “almost” a solution to the Nash system (2.11).
Proof. We compute each term in the above equation in terms of U using the relationship
(5.1), and we use the fact that U is a solution to the master equation.
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•N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
ui(t, z0, z1)
=
1
2
σ2∂zi
0
zi
0
ui(t, z0, z1) +
∑
k 6=i
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
ui(t, z0, z1)
=
1
2
σ2∂zi
0
zi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i) +
1
2
σ2
∑
k 6=i
1
N − 1
∂zk
0
[Dµi
0
U ](t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 )
+
1
2
σ2
∑
k 6=i
1
(N − 1)2
Dµi
0
µi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 , z
k
0 )
=
1
2
σ2∂zi
0
zi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i) +
1
2
σ2
∫
R
∂y0 [Dµi0U ](t, z
i
0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0)dµ
i
0(y0)
+
1
2
σ2
1
N − 1
∫
R
Dµi
0
µi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0, y0)dµ
i
0(y0).
•
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
ui)ds
=
∫ 0
−τ
zi1
d
ds
(∂zi
1
ui)ds+
∑
k 6=i
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
ui)ds
=
∫ 0
−τ
zi1
d
ds
(∂zi
1
U)ds+
∑
k 6=i
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
[
1
N − 1
Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 )
]
ds
=
∫ 0
−τ
zi1
d
ds
(∂zi
1
U)ds+
∫ 0
−τ
∫
H
y1
d
ds
[
Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y1)
]
dµi1(y1)ds.
• From the solution (4.9) of the master equation, ∂zU is Lipschitz with respect to the
measures. Namely,
|∂z0U(t, z
k, νi)− ∂z0U(t, z
k, νk)| ≤ C1(dMK(µ
i
0, µ
k
0) + dMK(µ
i
1, µ
k
1)) ≤
C1
N − 1
,
‖∂z1U(t, z
k, νi)− ∂z1U(t, z
k, νk)‖H ≤ C2(dMK(µ
i
0, µ
k
0) + dMK(µ
i
1, µ
k
1)) ≤
C2
N − 1
.
(5.3)
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Thus,
∑
k 6=i
(∂zk
0
uk − [∂zk
1
uk](−τ))(∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ))
=
∑
k 6=i
∂zk
0
U(t, zk0 , z
k
1 , ν
k)
(
1
N − 1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
k
1 , ν
i, zk0 )−
1
N − 1
[Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 )](−τ)
)
−
∑
k 6=i
[∂zk
1
U(t, zk0 , z
k
1 , ν
k)](−τ)
(
1
N − 1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
k
1 , ν
i, zk0 )−
1
N − 1
[Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 )](−τ)
)
=
∑
k 6=i
∂zk
0
U(t, zk0 , z
k
1 , ν
i)
(
1
N − 1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
k
1 , ν
i, zk0 )−
1
N − 1
[Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 )](−τ)
)
−
∑
k 6=i
[∂zk
1
U(t, zk0 , z
k
1 , ν
i)](−τ)
(
1
N − 1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
k
1 , ν
i, zk0 )−
1
N − 1
[Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk1 )](−τ)
)
+O(
1
N
)
=
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×H
(∂y0U − ∂y1U) (t, y0, y1, ν
i) ·
(
Dµi
0
U −Dµi
1
U
)
(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0, y1)dν(y0, y1)δ−τ (s)ds
+O(
1
N
).
Then,
∂tu
i +
N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
ui +
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
ui)ds
−
N∑
k 6=i
(∂zk
0
uk − [∂zk
1
uk](−τ))(∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ))−
1
2
(
∂zi
0
ui − [∂zi
1
ui](−τ)
)2
+
ǫ
2
(z¯0 − z
i
0)
2
=∂tU +
1
2
σ2∂zi
0
zi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i) +
1
2
σ2
∫
R
∂y0 [Dµi0U ](t, z
i
0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0)dµ
i
0(y0)
+
∫ 0
−τ
zi1
d
ds
(∂zi
1
U)ds+
∫ 0
−τ
∫
H
y1
d
ds
[
Dµi
1
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y1)
]
dµi1(y1)ds
−
∫
R×H
(∂y0U − [∂y1U ](−τ)) (t, y0, y1, ν
i) ·
(
Dµi
0
U − [Dµi
1
U ](−τ)
)
(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0, y1)dν
i(y0, y1)
−
1
2
(∂zi
0
U − [∂zi
1
U ](−τ))2 +
ǫ
2
(∫
y0dµ
i
0(y0)− z
i
0
)2
+O(
1
N
) +
1
2
σ2
1
N − 1
∫
R
Dµi
0
µi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, y0, y0)dµ
i
0(y0)
=O(
1
N
).
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Theorem 5.2. Let V i be the solution to the HJB equation (2.11) of the N-player system,
where N ≥ 1 fixed, and U be the solution to the master equation (4.6). Fix any (t0, ν0) ∈
[0, T ]×P(R×H). Then for any z ∈ RN , let νi = 1
N−1
∑N
j 6=i δ(zj
0
,z
j
1
), we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
|V i(t0, z)− U(t0, z
i, νi)| ≤ CN−1. (5.4)
Proof. We first apply Ito’s formula to (V i)i∈{1,...,N}, and use the fact that V
i satisfies the
HJB equation (2.11) for the Nash system.
dV i(t, Zt)
=∂tV
idt+ ∂zV
idZt +
1
2
Tr(∂zzV
id[Z,Z]t)
=∂tV
idt+ 〈AZ, ∂zV
i〉dt+ 〈Bαˆi, ∂zV
i〉dt+ 〈∂zV
i, G〉dWt +
1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzV
i)dt
=∂tV
idt+
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
V i)dsdt−
N∑
k=1
(∂zk
0
V i − [∂zk
1
V i](−τ))(∂zk
0
V k − [∂zk
1
V k](−τ))dt
+
N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
V idt+
N∑
k=1
σ∂zk
0
V idW kt
=
[
−
1
2
(∂zi
0
V i − [∂zi
1
V i](−τ))2 −
ǫ
2
(Z¯0 − Z
i
0)
2
]
dt+
N∑
k=1
σ∂zk
0
V idW kt .
(5.5)
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Then, we apply Ito’s formula to ui(t, Zt), and use the fact that u satisfies (5.2)
dui(t, Z)
=∂tu
idt+ ∂zu
idZt +
1
2
Tr(∂zzu
id[Z,Z]t)
=∂tu
idt+ 〈AZ, ∂zu
i〉dt+ 〈Bαˆi, ∂zu
i〉dt+ 〈∂zu
i, G〉dt+
1
2
Tr(G∗G∂zzu
i)dt
=∂tu
idt+
N∑
k=1
∫ 0
−τ
zk1
d
ds
(∂zk
1
ui)dsdt−
N∑
k=1
(∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ))(∂zk
0
V k − [∂zk
1
V k](−τ))dt
+
N∑
k=1
1
2
σ2∂zk
0
zk
0
uidt+
N∑
k=1
σ∂zk
0
uidW kt
=
N∑
k=1
(
∂zk
0
uk − [∂zk
1
uk](−τ)
)(
∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ)
)
dt
−
N∑
k=1
(∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ))(∂zk
0
V k − [∂zk
1
V k](−τ))dt−
1
2
(∂zi
0
ui − [∂zi
1
ui](−τ))2dt
−
ǫ
2
(Z¯0 − Z
i
0)
2dt− eidt+
N∑
k=1
σ∂zk
0
uidW kt .
(5.6)
Substracting (5.5) from (5.6), taking the square and applying Ito’s formula again, we
obtain
d[ui(t, Zt)− V
i(t, Zt)]
2
=2[ui(t, Zt)− V
i(t, Zt)](du
i(t, Zt)− dV
i(t, Zt)) + d[u
i − V i, ui − V i]t
=− 2(ui − V i)
(
1
2
(∂zi
0
ui − [∂zi
1
ui](−τ))2 −
1
2
(∂zi
0
V i − [∂zi
1
V i](−τ))2
)
dt− 2(ui − V i)eidt
− 2(ui − V i)
(
N∑
k=1
(
∂zk
0
ui − [∂zk
1
ui](−τ)
)(
(∂zk
0
V k − ∂zk
0
uk)−
(
[∂zk
1
V k](−τ) − [∂zk
1
uk](−τ)
)))
dt
+
N∑
k=1
σ2|∂zk
0
ui − ∂zk
0
V i|2dt+
N∑
k=1
σ
(
∂zk
0
ui − ∂zk
0
V i
)
dW kt .
(5.7)
Recall that ∂zk
0
ui(t, z0, z1) =
1
N−1
Dµi
0
U(t, zi0, z
i
1, ν
i, zk0 ) is bounded by
C
N
for k 6= i, and ei
is bounded by C
N
. Let (Ξi)i∈{1,...,N} be a family of independent random variable with common
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law ν0. By integrating (5.7) from t to T , and taking expectation conditional on Ξ, we have
E
Ξ[|uit − V
i
t |
2] + σ2
N∑
k=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zk
0
uis − ∂zk0V
i
s |
2ds
]
+ CEΞ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s | · |[∂zi1u
i
s](−τ)− [∂zi1V
i
s ](−τ)|
]
ds
+
C
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s | · |[∂zk1u
k
s ](−τ)− [∂zk1V
k
s ](−τ)|
]
ds
≤EΞ[|uiT − V
i
T |
2] + CEΞ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s | · |∂zi0u
i
s − ∂zi0V
i
s |
]
ds
+
C
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s | · |∂zk0u
k
s − ∂zk0V
k
s |
]
ds
+
C
N
∫ T
t
E
Ξ[|uis − V
i
s |]ds.
(5.8)
By the fact that uiT = V
i
T , and using Young’s inequality, we have
E
Ξ[|uit − V
i
t |
2] + EΞ
[∫ T
t
|∂zi
0
uis − ∂zi0V
i
s |
2ds
]
≤0 +
C
2ǫ1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
Cǫ1
2
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zi
0
uis − ∂zi0V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
C
2Nǫ2
N∑
k=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
Cǫ2
2N
N∑
k=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zk
0
uks − ∂zk0V
k
s |
2ds
]
+
C
2Nǫ3
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
Cǫ3
2N
∫ T
t
1ds
≤
C
N2
+ CEΞ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
C
2N
N∑
k=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zk
0
uks − ∂zk0V
k
s |
2ds
]
.
(5.9)
Taking average on both sides, we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Ξ[|uit − V
i
t |
2] +
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zi
0
uis − ∂zi0V
i
s |
2ds
]
≤
C
N2
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
CEΞ
[∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
+
C
2N
N∑
k=1
E
Ξ
[∫ T
t
|∂zk
0
uks − ∂zk0V
k
s |
2ds
]
⇒
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Ξ[|uit − V
i
t |
2] ≤
C
N2
+ CEΞ
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
t
|uis − V
i
s |
2ds
]
.
(5.10)
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By Gronwall’s inequality and taking supremum over [0, T ], we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Ξ|uit − V
i
t |
2
]
≤
C
N2
, (5.11)
which implies
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ui(t0,Ξ)− V
i(t0,Ξ)| ≤
C
N
. (5.12)
Choosing Ξ uniformly distributed in (R×H)N , then by continuity of ui and V i, and the fact
that ui(t, Z) is defined by U(t, Z i0, Z
i
1, ν
i), we have, for any z ∈ (R×H)N ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
|U(t0, z
i, νi0)− V
i(t0, z)| ≤
C
N
. (5.13)
6 Conclusion
The mean field game system acts as a characteristic of the master equation. The master
equation contains all the information in the mean field game system, and it turns the forward-
backward PDE into a single equation. The solution to the mean field game system is a pair
(V, ν), that is the value function and the joint law of current state and past law. The solution
to the master equation is a function of (t, z, ν).
Since our model is linear quadratic, we are able to solve both the mean field game system
and the master equation as shown in Section 3 and Section 4, however, the techniques are not
the same. The technique for solving the mean field game is that we first make an ansatz for
the solution of the HJB equation. Then plugging this ansatz into the Fokker-Planck equation
(3.8), we find that the means of state and past control are constant. Hence, the ansatz (3.9)
can be verified. On the other hand, a notion of derivative with respect to measure is needed
in order to solve the master equation. Again, we make an ansatz (4.9), which has a similar
form as (3.9) but is a function of (t, z, ν), and we verify that it satisfies the master equation.
The sets of PDEs (3.15) with boundary conditions (3.16) are the same for the two prob-
lems. This is due to the fact that our model is linear-quadratic and the means of states and
past controls are constants.
Last but not the least, the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding N -player game is
presented in Section 2. The value function (2.12) looks similar to the value function (3.9) in
the mean field game system and the solution (4.9) to the master equation. As N →∞, the
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set of PDEs (2.13) becomes the same as (3.15). This implies that the solution to the mean
filed game appears to be the limit of the Nash system, but generally, the convergence has
been known in very few specific situations. Additionally, the solution to the master equation
is also a limit to the Nash system, as shown in Section 5.
To summarize, we have extended the notion of master equation in the context of our toy
model with delay, and we have shown that, as in the case without delay, this master equation
provides an approximation to the corresponding finite-player game with delay. A general
form of such a result, not necessarily for linear-quadratic games, is part of our ongoing
research.
A Adjoint operator
Let ϕ be a smooth test function defined on R×H. In the following computation, we use the
notation
〈ϕ, ν(t)〉 =
∫
R×H
ϕ(z)dν(t, z).
If the test function ϕ is of the form ϕ(z) =
∫ 0
−τ
ψ(z0, z1(s))ds for a smooth function ψ defined
on R2, then
〈ϕ, ν(t)〉 =
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
ψ(z0, z1(s))ν(t, z0, z1(s))dz0dz1(s)ds,
where ν(t, z0, z1(s)) is understood as a two-dimensional density. By abuse of notation, we
also use
〈ϕ, ν(t)〉 =
∫
R×H
ϕ(z)ν(t, z)dz =
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
ψ(z)ν(t, z)dzds.
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Then, we have
〈Ltϕ, ν(t)〉
=
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
z1
d∂z1ϕ(z)
ds
ν(t, z)dzds +
∫
R×H
−(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))∂z0ϕ(z)ν(t, z)dz
−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
−(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))∂z1ϕ(z)δ−τ (s)ν(t, z)dzds
+
∫
R×H
1
2
σ2∂z0z0ϕ(z)ν(t, z)dz
=−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
dz1
ds
∂z1ϕ(z)ν(t, z)dzds +
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
z1∂z1ϕ(z)ν(t, z)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dzds
+
∫
R×H
∂z0 {(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν(t, z)} ϕ(z)dz
−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
∂z1 {(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν(t, z)} δ−τ (s)ϕ(z)dzds
+
∫
R×H
1
2
σ2∂z0z0ν(t, z)ϕ(z)dz
=
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
∂z1
(
dz1
ds
ν(t, z)
)
ϕ(z)dzds−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
∂z1(z1ν(t, z))ϕ(z)(δ0(s)− δ−τ (s))dzds
+
∫
R×H
∂z0 {(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν(t, z)} ϕ(z)dz
−
∫ 0
−τ
∫
R×R
∂z1 {(∂z0V − [∂z1V ](−τ))ν(t, z)} δ−τ (s)ϕ(z)dzds
+
∫
R×H
1
2
σ2∂z0z0ν(t, z)ϕ(z)dz
=〈ϕ,L∗tν(t)〉.
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